In this paper, we use an economic approach to determine households' life insurance needs. In the economic approach, life insurance needs and spending targets are simultaneously determined by smoothing households' living standards over their life cycles and ensuring comparable living standards for potential survivors. We demonstrate that life insurance recommendations provided by the economic approach are considerably different from those provided by the conventional approach. When comparing recommended with actual life insurance holdings, we find that underinsurance is widespread among secondary earners in married couples. We also identify a systematic gender bias: for any given level of financial vulnerability, couples provide significantly more protection for wives than for husbands.
The views expressed in this paper, including any discussion of financial planning methodology or software products, are those of the authors and not necessarily those of TIAA-CREF.
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> > > INTRODUCTION
Life insurance is easy to purchase. It is relatively cheap. And it is vital to most survivors. Hence, economic theory delivers one and only one prescription about life insurance -"buy it, if you need it." But knowing whether you need life insurance is not easy. And knowing that you need to buy life insurance and actually doing so are two different things.
The truth is that no one likes to think about dying. No one likes to talk about dying. No one likes to pay premiums for an event, in this case dying early, that may never occur. And no one likes to spend time with life insurance agents. "Economic man" thus meets "psychological man" head on when it comes to life insurance decisions. The chance to pit economics against psychology is just one reason economists have been studying the determinants and adequacy of life insurance holdings for close to two decades. The other is the significant policy implications of potentially finding that insurance holdings are inadequate for a major segment of the population.
The research on insurance adequacy produces a single clear and consistent message: When it comes to buying life insurance, economic man is making major mistakes. While many households are buying reasonable amounts of life insurance, others are buying far too little, and others are buying too much.
In this paper, we use an economic approach to determine households' life insurance needs. Unlike the conventional approach that asks households to specify their spending and insurance targets, the economic approach determines a household's life insurance needs and spending targets simultaneously by smoothing the household's living standards over its life cycle and ensuring comparable living standards for potential survivors. We show that life insurance recommendations provided by this approach are considerably different from those provided by the conventional approach. We also compare life insurance recommendations provided by our model with actual life insurance holdings and find underinsurance is widespread among secondary earners in married couples.
> > > THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO ACCESSING LIFE INSURANCE NEEDS
Economic theory predicts that households will save and insure in order to enjoy the same living standard over time and in the event of the death of a household head or spouse. This reflects the assumption that there are diminishing returns to bunching all one's spending at a given point in time. Economic theory in this case accords with common sense and every day observation. We save to be able to maintain our life styles in retirement. We buy health, auto, and homeowner insurance to be able to withstand a medical operation, a car wreck, or a house fire without getting burned financially. And we buy life insurance to make sure our survivors can continue to live at the same standard to which they have become accustomed. Life insurance, like other insurance, is used for consumption smoothing -economists' shorthand for trying to maintain a household's living standard no matter what transpires.
Note that consumption smoothing does not dictate spending exactly the same amount in all circumstances. When children are at home and there are more mouths to feed, consumption smoothing means spending more on food, clothing, vacations, etc. in order to keep each household member's living standard unchanged. Similarly, if a household head or spouse/partner passes away, total spending on the surviving household should drop because there is now one fewer person whose living standard needs to be preserved. Hence, life insurance recommendations need to adjust for household composition. They also need to take into account that two can live more cheaply than one (scale economies in household spending) and that children are generally cheaper than adults when it comes to maintaining a given living standard.
Also note that even when a household's composition is not changing, consumption smoothing does not dictate spending exactly the same amount each year. Special expenditures, like sending the children to college or paying for a wedding, are one-time events that must be paid for when they arise. These expenses are, by their nature, lumpy and come "off-the-top." So too do large housing transaction costs associated with changing homes. Consumption smoothing is also limited by the inability or unwillingness of households to smooth their living standards if it means going into debt. Economists refer to such households as borrowing constrained. Borrowing constrained households attempt to achieve the smoothest living standard through time that does not violate their borrowing constraints.
In calculating a household's smoothest living standard through time and, thus, the term life insurance needed each year to protect that living standard, a number of factors need to be taken into account including contingent plans, taxes, and Social Security benefits.
1 Contingent plans refer to how much surviving spouses/partners will earn, the special expenses they will incur, and the special receipts that will come their way. Examples here include a) a non-working spouse who would go back to work were his/her partner to die, b) plans to send children to expensive private school, but only if both spouses are alive, and c) increased gifts received by a surviving spouse from her/his parents.
Determining the full range of future Social Security benefits for which a household will be eligible is also important for generating appropriate life insurance recommendations. Properly calculating current and future taxes is another complicated, yet essential factor. Calculating current and future taxes is a difficult task for several reasons. First, one needs to carefully calculate federal and state income taxes as well as payroll taxes on an annual basis and for all possible survivor configurations of the household. Second, calculating income taxes for future years requires knowing how much income the household will receive from assets in those years, which depends on how much the household saves during earlier years. But how much the household saves depends on how much it spends, which depends on how much it expects to pay in future taxes. Thus future taxes depend on current spending and current spending depends on future taxes, generating what economists call a simultaneity problem. Dealing with this problem requires jointly solving for taxes and spending.
To summarize, developing life insurance recommendations based on consumption smoothing is a very difficult and complicated process, which requires dealing in fine detail with the complexity of tax and Social Security benefit provisions, incorporating contingent plans, and taking into account liquidity constraints. Given the challenge presented by all of these complexities, it is not surprising that traditional financial planning does not typically deal with these issues.
> > > CALCULATING LIFE INSURANCE
RECOMMENDATIONS USING AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
In our analysis, life insurance recommendations are calculated using an economic model based on life cycle consumption smoothing. (Our model is implemented using ESPlanner TM , a financial planning software.
2 ) Rather than ask a household to specify its spending targets, the economic approach finds the targets automatically. The economic approach uses dynamic programming techniques to smooth the household's highest sustainable living standard over its life cycle, taking into account the household's willingness to borrow, household composition, and economies of shared living.
Recommended time-paths of consumption expenditure, taxable saving, and term life insurance holdings are calculated in inflation-adjusted dollars. Consumption in this context is everything the household gets to spend after paying for its "off-the-top" expenditures such as housing transaction costs, emergency spending, life insurance premiums, special bequests, taxes, and net contributions to tax-favored accounts. Life insurance needs at each age by each spouse are calculated to guarantee that potential survivors suffer no decline in their living standards, taking into account the taxes and benefits the surviving spouse would receive each year thereafter. The household is left with zero terminal assets apart from the equity in homes that the household has chosen not to sell.
Before turning to a comparison of life insurance recommendations from our economic approach with those from the conventional approach, a major caveat is in order. While our model deals with a host of critical issues associated with retirement and survivorship planning, it does not deal with all such issues. For example, our model does not explicitly deal with uncertainty in labor earnings, rates of return, health expenditures, disability, and demographics, including the possibilities of remarriage. Nevertheless, we view recommendations from our model as a very useful benchmark, but not necessarily as delivering the absolute truth, when it comes to saving and insurance recommendations.
> > > RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AN ECONOMIC APPROACH: A CASE STUDY
Base-case Scenario
Consider a married couple named Joe and Sue. Joe is 30, and Sue is 28. Both have a maximum age of life of 95. Joe earns $100,000 a year, and Sue earns $50,000. Both expect to see their real earnings rise by 1 percent per year through retirement, which occurs when they reach age 65. The couple has two children ages 3 and 1. They expect to spend $35,000 per year in today's dollars in sending their children to college for four years each. They have $100,000 in regular assets and own a $300,000 house with a $240,000 thirty-year mortgage. Monthly mortgage payments are $1,500. Annual property taxes are $4,000. Homeowner insurance is $1,000, and annual home maintenance is $2,000. Both spouses are covered by Social Security. Both spouses plan to spend $7,500 for their funeral expenses and leave $50,000 in bequests, where both amounts are measured in today's dollars. Finally, the couple expects to earn a 6 percent nominal return on its saving and expects inflation to equal 3 percent.
Recommended life insurance amounts for Joe and Sue for this base-case scenario are reported in Row 1 of Table 1. Alternative Scenarios Table 1 also shows how differences in the couple's circumstances would affect their insurance recommendations. Some of the results may seem surprising until one considers how the change in the case affects the living standard to be protected by insurance or the resources to do so. For example, Row 2's assumption that the couple has $500,000 rather than $100,000 in initial assets. While traditional insurance calculators would generally recommend a $400,000 reduction in Joe's life insurance for Sue's benefits, our model recommends a much smaller decrease because it recognizes that a) the household will enjoy a higher living standard when both spouses are alive because it has more assets that it can spend and b) if Joe dies, Sue's living standard must be maintained at that higher level.
Row 3 considers a $1 million inheritance that Joe receives in five years, provided he's alive. Notice that Joe's recommended life insurance rises by much less than $1 million. The reason is that the inheritance permits the couple to enjoy a higher living standard, but part of the $1 million is used to pay for Joe's higher living standard. Sue does not need this part to maintain her higher living standard if Joe dies.
The next case entails Joe and Sue having their third child in 2002. While one might expect the addition of a child to raise life insurance needs, there are only modest increases in the insurance recommendations for Joe and Sue. The reason is that having the extra child lowers the living standard of Joe and Sue because of the need to pay for that child's consumption. Hence, if we consider Joe's insurance, he needs more because he has another child to protect, but less because he needs to guarantee Sue a reduced living standard.
Earlier retirement by both Joe and Sue generates a lower level of recommended insurance coverage for Joe, but a higher one for Sue. In Joe's case, he needs to maintain Sue at a lower living standard because the couple's sustainable living standard is lower than it was in the base case. In Sue's case, she needs to provide more protection for Joe because of the fact that a disproportionate fraction of the decline in the couple's earnings are due to the reduction in Joe's lifetime earnings. This process occurs in reverse in Row 7 in which both spouses' earnings grow at a real rate of 2 percent.
The case in which Joe and Sue earn a 6 percent real return, rather than the 3 percent real return assumed in the base case is interesting. Joe's recommended life insurance holdings decline from over $1 million to around $700,000, while Sue's decline from about $38,000 to zero. The explanation is that a higher rate of return make assets a much more powerful tool in providing spending protection to survivors. 
> > > COMPARING LIFE INSURANCE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE ECONOMIC AND CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES
Traditional financial planning usually asks households right off the bat how much they want to spend in retirement and how much they want their survivors to spend. It then calculates the amount of life insurance needed to cover those liabilities, based on the targets the household provides. Another common life insurance needs estimation approach applies "a rule of thumb" that uses current income as a proxy for desired future spending. Life insurance recommendations based on this approach are usually equal to a multiple of current income. Table 2 shows the life insurance recommendations calculated using our economic approach and those calculated using three life insurance calculators on the web. These calculators follow the conventional approach. Specifically, Example A simply applies "a rule of thumb" method that recommends a life insurance amount equal to between 6 and 10 times earnings. Examples B and C apply a needs-based analysis that calculates life insurance needs based on households' current income, expected future expenses, and other factors. Table 2 shows that recommendations from the three calculators vary widely and differ from the recommendations in our base case. Additional research comparing life insurance recommendations from the economic and conventional approaches is presented in Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Warshawsky (2001) . In that study, the authors compare the saving and insurance recommendations from the two approaches for 24 couples, 20 of whom stylized and the other four of whom actual households. The 20 stylized cases all share basic assumptions, but differ with respect to the details of the base household's circumstances and plans. The paper finds that the two approaches recommend dramatically different levels of saving or life insurance in each of the 24 cases. <8> research dialogue Accurate measurement of life insurance coverage is particularly critical for the analysis. The SCF survey data accounts for roughly 81 percent of aggregate inforce life insurance ($9.52 trillion out of $11.70 trillion) as reported by the American Council of Life Insurance. Since some life insurance policies are owned by companies, trusts, and foreign individuals rather than by U.S. households, the SCF figure appears to be in the right ballpark. Unfortunately, the SCF reports only total household life insurance holdings, not the holdings of each individual spouse. We used data from the 1992 HRS to impute this fraction for our sample households. Table 3 compares total (husband and wife) levels of recommended and actual insurance. Panel A separates households into four roughly equal-sized groups based on their levels of recommended insurance. The figures in Column 3 suggest that there is essentially no relationship between the need to hold insurance and the likelihood of doing so. Stated differently, the decision to obtain insurance appears to be uncorrelated with underlying financial vulnerabilities. Moreover, as a comparison of the medians in Columns 4 and 5 indicates, there is only a very weak relationship across groups between actual and recommended insurance holdings. A similar conclusion follows from a comparison of means (Columns 6 and 7).
> > > COMPARING ACTUAL WITH
RECOMMENDED INSURANCE HOLDINGS
Ta b l e 3 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f H o u s e h o l d s w i t h D i f f e r e n t L e v e l s o f R e c o m m e n d e d I n s u r a n c e
Ta b l e 4 D i s t r i b u t i o n o f P o t e n t i a l a n d A c t u a l R e d u c t i o n s i n L i v i n g S t a n d a r d s o f S u r v i v i n g S p o u s e s PANEL A: HUSBANDS AND WIVES
Surviving Spouses are:
Wives Husbands
Living
PANEL B: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EARNERS
Surviving Spouses are:
Secondary Earners Primary Earners
Living
Panel B of Table 3 contains the same information as panel A, except that insurance levels are expressed as ratios to household earnings. Note that the actual ratio is lowest for the most vulnerable group (those with ratios of recommended insurance to earnings in excess of 8). Moreover, regardless of whether one looks at medians (Columns 4 and 5) or means (Columns 6 and 7), the correlation of the ratio of recommended insurance to earnings with the ratio of actual insurance to earnings is very small.
Our study also included statistical tests that controlled for a variety of variables that might influence actual life insurance choice. These tests found essentially no relationship between actual insurance and recommended insurance at any age. This finding rules out the possibility that households purchase reasonable amounts of life insurance when young, but simply fail to adjust their holdings through time. Table 4 considers the impact of underinsurance on survivors. It compares the potential reduction of survivors' living standards were their spouses to die with no life insurance with the actual reduction these survivors would experience given reported insurance holdings. Results are presented for four different types of survivors -wives, husbands, primary earners, and secondary earners.
> > > THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNDERINSURANCE
For survivors who do not need insurance to have as high a living standard as they formerly enjoyed, the potential reduction in living standard from having no insurance is obviously zero. Almost three quarters of husbands and close to four-fifths of primary earners fit this bill. In contrast, less than 30 percent of wives and less than one quarter of secondary earners face no potential reduction in living standard from the death of their spouse.
At the opposite extreme, over 30 percent of wives and almost a third of secondary earners, most of whom are wives, would, in the absence of any insurance protection, experience a severe (40 percent or greater) drop in living standard were their spouse to pass away. Another one-fifth of wives and one-fifth of secondary earners would experience a significant (20 percent to 40 percent) decline in their living standard were their spouses to die.
How well does the actual purchase of insurance do in preventing severe living standard declines among those Ta b l e 5 : E f f e c t o f L i f e I n s u r a n c e o n C h a n g e s i n L i v i n g S t a n d who are most at risk, namely secondary earners? The answer is not very well. Almost two-thirds of secondary earners who are at risk to experience a severe reduction in their living standards do not have enough insurance protection to keep that outcome from happening. This group constitutes over one-fifth of all secondary earners! This finding is so troubling that it bears repeating with different words: One in five married couples has a secondary earner who is dramatically underinsured against the death of her/his spouse.
And, as Table 4 indicates, this is not the end of the problem. Another fifth or so of secondary earners would face a major -20 percent to 40 percentdrop in their living standard were the primary earner to die. All in all, almost two out of every three secondary earners is underinsured given their spouse's actual insurance coverage. Since roughly three out of four secondary earners would be underinsured were all primary earners to purchase no insurance, the actual purchase of insurance is making a pretty small dent in the incidence of underinsurance.
If most secondary earners are significantly or severely underinsured, what fraction of secondary earners are substantially overinsured? Table 4 provides the answer, namely about 5 percent; i.e., about 5 percent of secondary earners would experience a 20 percent or greater increase in their living standards relative to their living standard were their spouses to pass away leaving no insurance. Table 6 are quite close to those reported by Bernheim, Gokhale, Forni, and Kotlikoff (2002) using the HRS. They found that 13.4 percent of secondary earners between the ages of 56 and 70 have significant uninsured vulnerabilities while 7.6 percent have severe uninsured vulnerabilities. For 60 to 69 year old survivors the corresponding figures are 14.1 percent and 8.9 percent -again quite close to the values for the oldest age group in Table 6 .
Additional confirmation of the underinsurance problem comes from Berheim, Berstein, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff 's (2002) study of 268 married couples in which one or both spouses work for Boston University. The couples were all taken through our model as part of the study. Although these couples tend to be better educated and have higher earnings than the general population and are forced by the University to purchase minimum levels of insurance coverage, almost 28 percent of the couple's secondary earners face 20 percent or greater living standard reductions given actual life insurance holdings. Of these, almost half face 40 percent or greater living standard reductions. 
> > > POVERTY RATES AMONG WIDOWS
> > > CONCLUDING REMARKS
Research on life insurance adequacy reveals that underinsurance is prevalent. A significant fraction of secondary earners in married couples, the vast majority of whom are women, are significantly or severely underinsured against the untimely death of their spouse. What explains this finding? It does not seem to be price, because the life insurance industry is highly competitive and insurance premiums are generally quite reasonable. And it does not seem to be lack of available products or reminders that insurance is important. Life insurance companies, advertisements, and salesmen abound. Instead, questionable financial advice, inertia, procrastination, and the unpleasantness of thinking carefully about one's death are the likely culprits.
Studies of life insurance inadequacy may help sensitize the public to the magnitude of the problem, but they are not likely to radically change behavior. Given this, one needs to ask about the role of government in providing and/or mandating additional insurance coverage. Social Security survivor benefits represent a form of life insurance, and increases in their levels represents the surest and quickest means of alleviating the problem. Unfortunately, Social Security is in deep financial trouble and net benefit increases seem unlikely for the conceivable future. Perhaps the best one could hope for then would be a change in the mix of Social Security benefits in favor of survivor benefits at the price of reduced retirement benefits. But reducing Social Security retirement benefits would raise its own concern because the country not only has lots of underinsurers, but also lots of undersavers.
